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PREDICTABILITY IN MERGER
ENFORCEMENT AFTER
CALIFORNIA v. AMERICAN
STORES: CURRENT
UNCERTAINTIES AND A
PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
INTRODUCTION
In the 1990 decision California v. American stores, the Supreme Court unanimously held that divestiture is a remedy available to states and private plaintiffs under section 16 of the Clayton
Act. In this note, the author argues that by allowing the states to
seek divestiture, the American Stores decision makes it more difficult for firms complying with the federal enforcement authorities to
predict whether their mergers will subsequently be challenged by
state authorities. To remedy this problem, the author proposes
changes to section 7A(h) of the Clayton Act governing the distribution of Hart-Scott-Rodinofiling information. The author argues that
Congress should amend the Act to allow the distribution of the
HSR information to the states for the limited purposes of conducting pre-merger negotiations or filing a section 7 suitfor divestiture
before a merger is consummated This proposal will create a
single federal/state enforcement process that will inform firms of
problems in a manner that is timely, clear and final before they
complete a merger.
Predictability and certainty in the law are necessary in an
ordered society. They provide a coherent framework for behavior,
enabling people to conclude whether or not specific actions and
expectations are permissible and reasonable. Commentaries on the
development of the common law assert that a legal system provid-
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ing a high degree of predictability facilitates business and social
transactions and ultimately promotes the administration of justice.'
The creation and evolution of laws reflect this "undoubted public
interest in 'stability and orderly development of the law ....
Lawmakers have attempted to provide predictability and certainty in many areas of the law. For example, uniform acts such as
the Uniform Commercial Code3 and the Model Penal Code4 promote certainty in their respective fields of law by defining terms,
adding finality to enforcement and establishing a framework for
dispute resolution.5 These legal guides facilitate the functioning of
a complex society by delineating the parameters of permissible
activity and by clarifying the consequences for those who step
beyond them.
Predictability and certainty, however, can be difficult to
achieve. Existing laws may not always provide a definitive resolution for problems which arise. Furthermore, the law may not be as
clear as it could be because no political consensus has developed
favoring one approach over any other or because legislators consciously avoid an issue they view as a political quagmire. These
factors strain the effectiveness of legal standards which can neither
answer every unforeseen conflict nor account for changing political
trends. As a result, a legal code is often not a sufficient articulation of the law.
An effective legal standard contemplates not only predictability
and certainty, but also the standard's ability to produce correct
results. Delivering justice on an individual basis requires a factual
inquiry into each particular case. Effectiveness, therefore, depends
on whether the standard can accommodate individual circumstances,
novel legal issues or extraneous influences and still produce a just
result. Tension exists between the general statement of a legal

1. FREDERIC R. COUDERT, CERTAINTY AND JUSTICE 1 (1914).
2. Charles J. Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedent and Principle In Constitutional Adjudication, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 405 (1988) (quoting Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 644 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
3. U.C.C. xv, I U.L.A. xv (1989) ("Uniformity throughout American jurisdictions is
one of the main objectives of this Code ...

.

4. MODEL PENAL CODE (1985).
5. For example, the U.C.C. article governing sales transactions defines relevant terms,
U.C.C. § 2-105, 1 U.L.A. 198-99, and specifies parties' remedies when disputes between
them arise, § 2-711, lB U.L.A. 321-22. Similarly, the Model Penal Code defines pertinent
terms, such as the levels of culpability necessary to prove particular offenses, M.P.C. §
2.02(2).
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standard and the ability of that standard to render workable or
accurate results in a particular situation.
Antitrust law exemplifies this clash between predictability and
correct results. Antitrust law reflects society's concern about unfair
business practices that might threaten the availability of goods and
services when too few entities control production. The monopolies
controlled by industrial giants of the late nineteenth century
prompted Congress to enact antitrust laws to provide "a competitive, free enterprise economy unencumbered by unreasonable or
monopolistic restrictions on free market forces."6 The Sherman
Antitrust Act, 7 the Clayton Act,8 the Celler-Kefauver Act9 and the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 19760 reflect
Congress' desire to prevent the anticompetitive effects of merg11
ers.
The Clayton Act prohibits corporations from acquiring, either
directly or indirectly, the assets of another corporation if the acquisition weakens competition substantially or creates a monopoly. 2
The Act also creates a comprehensive enforcement policy providing
that "[a]ny person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled
to sue for and have injunctive relief ... against threatened loss or
damage by a violation of the antitrust laws .. .

Divestiture, one remedy for antitrust violations, has been the
subject of recent debate within the Circuit Courts. The Ninth Circuit ruled that states and private parties could not seek a divestiture
of those firms found guilty of Clayton Act violations, 14 while the
6. 1 EARL W. KINTNER, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST
LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES 7 (1978).

7. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1-7 (1988)).
8. Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version in scattered sections of
15, 18 & 29 U.S.C. (1988)).
9. Act of Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§
18, 21 (1988)).
10. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, ch. 323, 90 StaL 1383
(1976) (codified in scattered sections of 15, 18 & 28 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Hart-ScottRodino]. When referring to the procedures or information required by Hart-Scott-Rodino,
this note uses the acronym HSR.
11. "The purpose of the antitrust laws is to promote competition and to inhibit monopoly and restraints upon freedom of trade in all sectors of the economy to which these
laws apply."

LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN,

(1977). See also
competitors).
12. Clayton Act
other corporations).
13. Clayton Act
14. International

HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 3

Id. § 204(a) (analyzing the consequences of mergers between direct
§ 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (governing corporations' acquisitions of stock of
§ 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26.
Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 518 F.2d 913, 920
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First Circuit held that divestiture might be an appropriate remedy- 5 In California v. American Stores Co.,' 6 the Supreme Court
issued a unanimous decision resolving this split in the Circuits. The
Court ruled that divestiture is available to state governments and
private plaintiffs to remedy violations of the Clayton Act.17 The
Court reasoned that private suits for divestiture support Congress'
original intent of creating a vigorous antitrust enforcement structure
by coupling government enforcement with private policing."8
Since American Stores, federal courts have the power to grant
a state or private plaintiff's request for divestiture as an equitable
remedy to prevent the anticompetitive effects of a merger. However, in the wake of American Stores, merging parties have no clear
guidelines indicating when a divestiture will be granted to a state
and, therefore, do not know how to structure their transactions to
avoid divestiture. Prior to American Stores, merging firms could
file under the HSR requirements,19 negotiate an agreement com(9th Cir. 1975).
15. See CIA. Petrolera Caribe, Inc. v. Arco Carribean, Inc., 754 F.2d 404, 429 (1st
Cir. 1985) (rejecting a per se limitation on divestiture for private plaintiffs).
16. 110 S. CL 1853 (1990).
17. Id. at 1867 (holding that the plain meaning of § 16 allows private parties or state
governments to seek divestiture as an equitable remedy).
18. Id. at 1860. To employ private actions as a complement to government efforts,
Congress included straightforward language allowing a cause of action in equity under §
16 of the Clayton Act. Denying the divestiture remedy would unduly limit that cause of
action in derogation of the policy goals underlying antitrust enforcement.
The Court qualified its decision by noting that "the power to order divestiture . . .
does not, of course, mean that such power should be exercised in every situation ...
Id.
19. See Hart-Scott-Rodino § 7A, 15 U.S.C. § 18a. The Act prohibits acquisition of any
voting securities or-assets of another person (or corporation) unless both persons file notification with the Department of Justice ("DOJ") or the Federal Trade Commission
("FrC") under the following circumstances:
(1) the acquiring person, or the person whose voting securities or assets are being acquired, is engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting
commerce;

(2) (A) any voting securities or assets of a person engaged in manufacturing which has annual net sales or total assets of $10,000,000 or more are
being acquired by any person which has total assets or annual net sales of
$100,000,000 or more;
(3) any voting securities or assets of a person not engaged
in manufacturing which has total assets of $10,000,000 or more are being acquired by any person which has total assets or annual net sales of
$100,000,000 or more; or
(C) any voting securities or assets of a person with annual
net sales or total assets of $100,000,000 or more are being acquired by any
person with total assets or annual net sales of $10,000,000 or more; and
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plying with the federal government's standards and proceed with
the merger without fear that another party could initiate subsequent
proceedings that might lead to a finding of non-compliance and
thwart the transaction. After American Stores, satisfying federal
authorities does not guarantee that merging firms will not subsequently be sued by either a state or private plaintiff seeking divestiture.
American Stores creates predictability problems of two varieties for merging firms: predictability of the outcome and predictability of the process. Outcome refers to the results of merger analyses
conducted by enforcement authorities and reviewed by the courts.
Predictability of outcome depends on 1) whether enforcement authorities and the courts consistently apply an explicit and specific
analytical standard when evaluating mergers and 2) whether enforcement authorities will exercise their discretion to challenge a
merger even when the transaction satisfies the standard.2" If the
enforcement authorities and the courts consistently apply a specific
standard, a firm desiring to merge will be able to predict whether
the merger will be challenged and adjust its behavior accordingly.
Predictability of the process refers to the regulatory procedures
firms must follow to complete a merger. An enforcement process is
predictable if it is timely, clear and final. Timeliness requires that
enforcement officials evaluate a proposed merger within a reasonable period of time. In order to be clear, the enforcement process
must specify the necessary participants, the procedures and the

(3) as a result of such acquisition, the acquiring person would hold(A) 15 per centum or more of the voting securities or assets of the acquired person, or
(B) an aggregate total amount of the voting securities and
assets of the acquired person in excess of $15,000,000.
Id.
20. Firms may attempt to test the limits of enforcement standards by submitting merger
proposals in potentially questionable cases to the FTC or DOJ, depending on which agency is assigned to evaluate mergers in the area of commerce affected by the merger. The
designated agency may then decide to approve the merger or to challenge the merger.
Negotiation between the federal agency (DOJ or FTC) and the merging firms might take
place when the merger presents problems the firms can remedy through partial divestitures. See California v. American Stores, 110 S. Ct. at 1856 (finding that the FTC approved the merger after American Stores complied with the FTC's condition that it divest
itself of several Lucky Stores that it would obtain through the merger).
The negotiation process is one mechanism which can relieve the tension between
legal standards and correct results. Through negotiation, the parties can reach a compromise in which impermissible aspects of a specific merger are deleted so that the transaction satisfies applicable legal standards without sacrificing the entire deal.
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rights and obligations each party possesses at each stage. Finality
demands that merging firms be able to rely upon an authoritative
decision like those of the FTC or DOJ to determine whether proposed transactions will be challenged.
Outcome and process are related. The desired outcome will
necessarily affect the structure of the process. If standards are
applied uniformly, it is possible to achieve the goals of timeliness,
clarity and finality in the process as well as predictability of outcome.
This note explores predictability of outcome and process in the
context of current federal and state enforcement of the federal antimerger statutes. Specifically, it explores the problem the American
Stores decision creates with respect to outcome and process. The
issues presented by American Stores highlight many of the problems related to outcome and process in merger enforcement; the
Court's holding exacerbates them.
This note proposes modifications to improve the predictability
of merger proposal evaluations with respect to the antitrust laws.
Specifically, the note explores mechanisms for maintaining an
effective federal antitrust policy that contemplates the availability of
the divestiture remedy to states. Ultimately, enforcement of the anti-merger laws would be best served by supplanting the present
system with a consistent analytical standard and process to guide
the efforts of both federal and state authorities. This proposal rests
on a variety of assumptions and value-judgments regarding the
desirability and effectiveness of a federal merger policy.2
Part I of this note examines the state of antitrust law prior to
American Stores and analyzes the decision itself.' This review
illustrates that a greater degree of predictability in both outcome
and process existed at that time. The discussion of the American
Stores decision highlights the changes it made in the law that
diminish the predictability of outcome and process in mergers.
Any modifications to antitrust law made to recapture predictability of both outcome and process will necessarily reflect a particular antitrust policy. Part II of this note explores federal and
state antitrust policies, highlighting the major goals and concerns of
each and stressing the differences between the perspectives and

21. See infra text accompanying notes 72-90, 129-36.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 26-71.
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agendas which guide their enforcement policies. 23 Comparing the
federal and state approaches reveals that a uniform policy must be
the basis for modifying existing federal antitrust laws. Nonetheless,
to be effective, the modifications must acknowledge the significant
role of the states in enforcing the federal antitrust laws and provide
a venue for states to safeguard their positions throughout the enforcement process.
Part I proposes modifications to the antitrust laws that will
accommodate the availability of a divestiture remedy for states and
private plaintiffs, strengthen federal antitrust enforcement and increase the predictability in both the outcome and process of merger
enforcement.24 These modifications address the relationship between the federal and state authorities participating in the enforcement process and do not extend to private plaintiffs. Specifically,
this note proposes (1) distributing the HSR filing information to
state attorneys general and (2) allowing states to use that information only in the pre-merger negotiation stages or to file a challenge
to the merger under section 7 of the Clayton Act in federal
court.,
PART I
A.

Mergers And Acquisitions Prior To Californiav. American
Stores: Predictability In Outcome And Process

The merger enforcement process offered a greater degree of
predictability before American Stores than it has offered since that
decision. In a typical merger prior to American Stores, firms filed
statutorily required information describing proposed mergers with
26
either the FTC or the DOJ under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act.
Federal authorities then reviewed the filings for indications of
potential anti-competitive effects caused by the merger.2 7 Negotia-

23. See supra text accompanying notes 72-107.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 108-47.
25. Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over cases arising under the federal antitrust laws. 28 U.S.C. § 1337(a).
26. Hart-Scott-Rodino § 7A, 15 U.S.C. § 18a.
27. The FIC and DOJ use the required information primarily to discern the market
impact of a given merger. For example, the DOJ conducts an economic analysis to determine whether the merger will "create or enhance 'market power' or... facilitate its
exercise." U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823, 26,827
(1984) [hereinafter Merger Guidelines].
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tions might follow during which federal authorities would express
their misgivings about the expected impact on market share and the
merging finns would agree to resolve anticipated problems.28
Under the old regime, adherence to the negotiated settlement
usually protected firms from post-merger divestiture suits brought
by the federal government, absent any significant unforeseen changes in the merged firms' projected market share.29 A divestiture
suit can follow a negotiated settlement and a completed merger. As
a result, merging firms cannot rely absolutely on the federal
government's pre-merger decisions. However, government decisions
to forgo lawsuits made sense because challenging mergers after
good-faith negotiations would discourage firms from engaging in
future negotiations with the government. Furthermore, because
firms were dealing with only one enforcement agency, they could
reasonably conclude that the agency's view would be final. Therefore, the merging firms could expect that a pre-merger settlement
would most likely prevent a post-merger lawsuit even though no
legal mechanism existed then or now to bar future government
action.
Two scenarios illustrate when post-settlement government
challenges to a completed merger are justified: (1) where the
merging fims have supplied the FTC or DOJ with incomplete or
inaccurate HSR information; and (2) where the government must
interpret conflicting facts about the impact of a merger and choose
28. Government action with respect to mergers varies with changes in the prevailing
political and economic ideologies. An historical overview of antitrust disputes reveals
different degrees of enforcement among different administrations. See generally Arthur
Austin, Antitrust Reaction to the Merger Wave: The Revolution vs. the Counter Revolution, 66 N.C. L. REV. 931 (1988) (tracing the history of antitrust enforcement including
emergence of the Chicago School of economic analysis as the theoretical basis for analyzing market impact of mergers). For example, contrary to the conservative tendency toward
deregulation, the Nixon administration pursued a policy of strict antitrust enforcement,
challenging most mergers as anticompetitive. Id. at 940. The Warren Court also tended to
be anti-merger. During the Warren era, the Court developed a variety of quantitative rules
which it then used as the basis for prohibiting most mergers that came before it. Id. at
936. In contrast, President Reagan's antitrust policies were described as "Reagan
NonantitrusL" Id. at 943. Critic's of the Reagan approach to antitrust enforcement implicate it as the cause of a wasteful merger wave and a "source of moral corruption and the
subversion of business ethics." Id. at 944.
The effects of various political and economic philosophies on outcome and process
are relatively predictable because the policy goals of a particular administration are usually
readily apparent. Difficulties in predicting the success of a proposed merger are more
likely to stem from ambiguous, malleable analytical standards and processes governing
merger enforcement.
29. For a discussion of market power, see infra text accompanying notes 78-87.
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between them as a basis for its decision. The first scenario is perhaps the clearest situation in which the government should not be
estopped from bringing a post-merger divestiture suit. If merging
firms are not entirely candid with the enforcement authorities, a
subsequent post-merger divestiture suit is reasonable and just."0 A
lack of candor suggests that certain damaging information pertaining to potential anticompetitive effects was withheld. The policy of
vigorous enforcement should encourage suits in these situations.
The second scenario, positing a government's choice between
conflicting data about the impact of a merger, illustrates a problem
inherent in analyzing mergers - economic analysis often produces
conflicting indications about the effects of a merger. The economic
theories and methods of analysis chosen may focus on different
facts in reaching a conclusion. This problem gives rise to two
questions. First, upon which set of facts should the government
rely to determine whether the merger is permissible? Second, after
selecting particular facts as the relevant criteria for its decision,
should the government be estopped from bringing a divestiture suit
if its choice proves incorrect?
The Supreme Court answered these questions when it held in
United States v. General Dynamics Corp.3" that despite the apparent nonoccurrence of anticompetitive effects, a divestiture claim is
available long after completion of a merger.32 The Court indicated
that the facts relied upon by the FTC or DOJ to determine whether
or not a merger is anticompetitive are not dispositive of the estoppel issue because the relevant time period extends to the moment a

30. See, e.g., Nolan v. Lee Hoo, 577 A.2d 143, 146 (N.J. 1990) (stating that a setflement agreement is a contract which will be honored by the court unless fraud or other
compelling circumstances are shown).
31. 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
32. See id. at 506 (holding that the district court justifiably focused on qopsiderations
other than undue concentration in the coal industry in deciding that no substantial lessening of competition occurred or was threatened by the defendant's acquisition of a strip
mining company). In a footnote, the Court stated:
The mere nonoccurrence of anticompetitive effects from a merger
would, of course, merely postpone rather than preclude a divestiture suit. This
Court indicated in United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S.
586, 597, that a merger may be attacked ab initio
long after its culmination if
effect on competition not apparent immediately after the merger subsequently
appears, since § 7 was designed to arrest the creation of monopolies "'intheir
incipiency" and "'incipiency' . . . denotes not the time the stock was acquired,
but any time when the acquisition threatens to ripen into a prohibited effect .
Id. at 505 n.13.
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merger threatens competition.3 3 Therefore, if the facts relied upon
at the time of a merger change substantially, a divestiture suit may
become warranted.
With respect to the second question, whether the government
should be estopped when it incorrectly predicts the effects of a
merger, the Court answered by focusing on the goal of a section 7
suit, "to arrest the creation of monopolies 'in their
incipiency' ....
The Court construed this provision as a tool
to correct the inaccuracies of economic analysis by allowing a
divestiture suit in the event market conditions change significantly.3 If the government were estopped from bringing a divestiture
suit under these circumstances, corporations would be allowed to
continue potentially anticompetitive practices, thereby frustrating the
purposes of the antitrust laws. Predictions about the market impact
of proposed mergers are only educated guesses, not concrete conclusions that a merger will affect the market in a particular way.
For this reason, the second scenario offers an equally strong justification for allowing post-merger suits. The government could not
uphold antitrust policies if merging firms were absolutely insulated
from a post-merger suit.
The preceding discussion illustrates the tension inherent in
antitrust law. Predetermined standards set out in statutes do not
provide an entirely accurate means of predicting the impact of a
merger. Yet, despite the potential for post-merger challenges, the
merger process before American Stores offered enough certainty
that the business world was willing to engage heavily in merger
activity during the 1980's. In 1980, the reported value of completed mergers was $33 billion. 36 By 1989, this figure had reached
$230 billion, an increase of more than 600 percent.37 In 1988, the
DOJ received approximately 2300 HSR filings." Of that number,
the DOJ investigated approximately sixty mergers and ultimately
challenged twelve as violating section 7 of the Clayton Act. 39 As
these statistics illustrate, the majority of mergers subject to the
"34

33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 505.
Id.
Id. at 505 n.13.
Seymour D. Lewis, Why States Are Stepping Up Attacks on Large Mergers, MERG-

ERS AND ACQUISITIONS, July-Aug. 1990, at 1, 35.

37. Id.
38. Panel Discussion, Merger Enforcement at the Antitrust Division, 58 ANTrrRUST L.J
329, 330 (1989).
39. Id.
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Hart-Scott-Rodino filing requirements proceed without a challenge
from the federal enforcement authorities.
The federal government's enforcement policy also supports the
conclusion that the pre-American Stores merger process offered
firms a reasonably certain means of successfully completing a
merger. Even though the DOJ or F1C may file a post-merger
divestiture suit, policy statements reflect a preference to do otherwise. According to John W. Clark, Deputy Director of Operations
at the DOJ's Antitrust Division, "[DOJ] always make every effort,
if [it] decide[s] that [it] must sue, to bring that case before the
transaction is consummated. That is what is behind Hart-ScottRodino."40 The statute's pre-merger notification requirements facilitate efforts by the government and merging firms to resolve problems prior to completion of the merger. The government's policy
to challenge mergers before their completion, if at all, strengthens
goodwill during settlement negotiations and offers firms incentives
to comply with the filing requirements at the outset. As a result,
the DOJ and FTC ultimately improve merger enforcement by not
seeking post-merger divestitures on a regular basis.
Prior to American Stores, suits by states and private plaintiffs
seeking divestiture were not a significant concern for merging
firms. In some cases, those claims were not permitted by federal
courts.4 States and private plaintiffs could seek other remedies
including hold separate orders and preliminary injunctions which
would effectively prevent the consummation of a merger,4 2 but the
divestiture suit, with its drastic consequences, was essentially re-

.40.

Id. at 333.
41. See, e.g., CIA. Petrolera Caribe, Inc. v. Arco Carribean, Inc., 754 F.2d 404, 414
(1st Cir. 1985) (divestiture not available to states).
42. Generally, if a court grants a hold separate order or a preliminary injunction, the
order will effectively stop the merger. FC v. PPG Industries, Inc., 798 F.2d 1500, 1506
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (characterizing preliminary injunctions as "merger-blocking"); FTC v.
Weyerhauser Co., 665 F.2d 1072, 1075 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (explaining that hold separate
orders "require[] the acquiring company to preserve the acquired company . . . as a separate and independent entity during the course of antitrust proceedings"). Few firms are
likely to find the anticipated benefits of merger worth the costs of pursuing the uphill
battle of completing a merger that a court deems potentially anticompetitive at the outset.
A court will grant a hold separate order or preliminary injunction when it appears
that a merger could have potentially anticompetitive effects and threatens to harm the
plaintiff. Weyerhauser, 665 F.2d at 1085. Furthermore, there is a "presumption in favor of
a preliminary injunction when the [government] establishes a strong likelihood of success
on the merits." PPG Industries, 798 F.2d at 1507. Preventing an eventual determination
that a merger is unlawful may require such substantial modifications to the merger agreement that the transaction will not be profitable.
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served to the federal authorities. Therefore, pre-merger settlement
with the federal government usually meant that firms could expect
that a post-merger challenge as devastating as a divestiture suit
would not occur.
B.

California v. American Stores -

Predictability Unraveled

1. The Case and its Holding
American Stores, a supermarket chain operating more than
1500 stores in forty states, was the fourth largest grocery store
chain in California.43 Lucky Stores, operating in seven western
and midwestern states, was the largest chain in California.' Pursuant to the HSR filing requirements,45 American Stores notified
the FTC on March 21, 1988, that it intended to acquire all of
Lucky's outstanding stock, worth $2.5 billion.46
Following its investigation, the FTC negotiated a settlement
with American Stores. In conjunction with the negotiations, the
FTC filed a suit alleging that the merger violated section 7 of the
Clayton Act. The FTC agreed to settle the suit if American Stores
would agree to comply with a consent order imposing certain conditions upon the merger.4 7 As one condition, the court imposed a
hold separate order until American Stores divested itself of certain supermarkets.4 9 American Stores agreed to comply with the
FTC requirements, took steps to divest as directed and, thereafter,
completed the merger on August 30, 1988.
The day after the FTC gave its final approval to the merger,

43. California v. American Stores Co., 110 S. Ct. 1853, 1856 (1990).
44. Id.
45. See supra note 19.
46. American Stores, 110 S. Ct. at 1856.
47. Id. at 1856.
48. Id. Hold separate orders are used to maintain the individual identity of merging
firms pending the completion of investigations or, as here, pending compliance with various conditions imposed by federal authorities. By maintaining the firms as separate entities, courts avoid the difficult task of splitting apart firms unable to comply with conditions for approval or whose merger is found to violate the antitrust laws. FTC v.
Weyerhauser Co., 665 F.2d 1072, 1075 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
49. American Stores, 110 S. Ct. at 1856 & n.2. The Court required American Stores
to maintain separate books for the acquisitions, prevent waste of Lucky's California operations, retain Lucky's executives, maintain Lucky as viable competitor, refrain from selling
Lucky's warehouse, distribution or manufacturing facilities, and preserve separate purchasing practices. Id. at 1856 n.2.
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California filed a complaint in federal district court5 0 alleging,
inter alia, that the merger violated section 7 of the Clayton Act. 1
Specifically, California complained that the merger would effectively eliminate competition in many areas of the state. Among the
remedies sought by California was "an injunction requiring American Stores to divest itself5 2of all .of Lucky's assets and businesses
in the state of California."
Finding that California's statistical evidence "proved a prima
facie violation of [section] 7 of the Clayton Act," the district court
issued a preliminary injunction blocking the merger. 3 Because the
merger was complete "as a matter of legal form,"' American
Stores argued that the preliminary "injunction was 'tantamount to
divestiture."' 55 The lower court concluded, however, that because
separate order was in effect, the merger was not yet comthe hold
56
plete.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that California had proven a
likelihood of success on its section 7 challenge, but that issuance
of the preliminary injunction was impermissible.5 7 The circuit
court based its decision on International Telephone & Telegraph
Corp. v. General Telephone & Electronics Corp., which held
that divestiture, either direct or indirect, was not an available remedy in private actions. 9
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 6 to resolve a conflict
between the Ninth Circuit's holding in American Stores and the
First Circuit's decision allowing divestiture in CL4. Petrolera
Caribe, Inc. v. Arco Caribbean, Inc.61 Holding in favor of California, the Court "agree[d] that the plain text of § 16 [of the Clayton Act] authorizes divestiture decrees to remedy § 7 *viola50. Id. at 1856.
51. The complaint also alleged a violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. Id.
52. Id. (citing California's prayer for relief).
53. Id. at 1857.
54. Id. at 1856.
55. Id. at 1857.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 518 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1975).
59. Id. at 924. For an explanation of how hold separate orders can constitute an indirect order for divestiture, see supra note 42 and accompanying text. The ITT court
warned that it is not permissible for courts to "accomplish through verbal calisthenics that
which .. . [can] not [be] accomplish[ed] directly." Id.
60. See American Stores, 110 S. Ct. at 1856.
61. 754 F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 1985). The Petrolera court's opinion summarizes the split
of authority regarding the availability of divestiture to private litigants. Id. at 414.
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The Supreme Court based its decision on the broad remedial
language of the Clayton Act.63 Furthermore, the Court examined
the sparse legislative history and found no clear Congressional
intent to limit the divestiture remedy to actions prosecuted by the
federal government.6 In fact, the Court held that Congress did
not intend "to constrict the availability of injunctive remedies
against violations that have already begun or occurred, but rather to
expand their availability against harms that are as yet unrealized."6 The Court noted that this expansive construction of the
remedies available to redress section 7 violations coincides with the
general purpose of the remedies provision to facilitate broad and
vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws.'
In American Stores, the Supreme Court interpreted section 16
of the Clayton Act as arming the states with the power to seek
divestiture.67 Tis interpretation gave the states an additional
mechanism to challenge questionable mergers. Although the Court's
decision was consistent with the terms of the statute, the American
Stores opinion has left many problematic issues for Congress to
resolve.
2.

Problems and Uncertainties

Since the American Stores decision allowing the states to seek
divestiture, states have a more significant role in enforcing the
federal merger laws. A state's ability to exercise this power raises
serious considerations that mergmg firms cannot ignore. These
concerns go beyond the mere possibility that a suit challenging a
merger will be brought by state enforcement authorities as well as

62. American Stores, 110 S. CL at 1859.
63. Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26. See supra text accompanying note 13.
64. Amertcan Stores, 110 S. Ct. at 1866.
65. Id. at 1859 n.8.
66. Id. at 1860. The Court stated, "by construing § 16 to encompass divestiture decrees we are better able
to harmonize the section with its statutory context. The
Act's other provisions manifest a clear intent to encourage vigorous private litigation
against anticompetitive mergers." Id.
67. See generally Paul V Timmins, Note, Divestiture as a Remedy Brought in Private
Actions Under Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1579 (1986) (arguing
that a court should be free to exercise its remedial powers to the full extent since Congress did not expressly limit courts' equity jurisdiction m § 16 of the Clayton Act).
Timmins concluded that divestiture could be an appropnate remedy after he analyzed the
language of § 16, the relevant legislative history of the Clayton Act, courts' right to
exercise their equitable powers and policy considerations favoring the divestiture remedy.
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by federal agencies. State antitrust concerns differ from federal
concerns because states focus on the local impact of a merger such
as loss of jobs and other effects on particular communities. Because state concerns diverge from the concerns of the federal government, states have created different standards to evaluate merg68
ers.
American Stores, therefore, interferes with firms' ability to
predict the outcome of proposed mergers by facilitating state assessments under different analytical standards than those applied by
the FTC or DOJ. Firms may even find themselves in a catch-22
where satisfying a federal condition for merger approval conflicts
with a state objective. In addition, if a claim seeking divestiture
advanced an erroneous standard for decision, a court might incorrectly adopt it, creating an open door for potentially dangerous
precedent. Subjecting proposed mergers to reviews under different
analytical standards creates the potential for inconsistent enforcement decisions by federal and state authorities which are, ironically, executing enforcement powers conferred by the same federal
statutes.
American Stores also disrupts the predictability of the process
in several ways. First, the holding adversely affects the timeliness
of the merger enforcement process. The decision to merge reflects
a business judgment that the merger will increase productivity,
efficiency and earnings. Firms expect that the proposed transaction
will not be the subject of a prolonged investigation by authorities
incapable of rendering a fairly certain decision in a reasonable
amount of time. The FTC and DOJ have generally satisfied this
expectation by providing merging firms with prompt indications
about whether or not they intend to challenge a particular merger.
Following American Stores, however, firms must also assess the
potential for a state challenge, thus diverting their attention to the
states' enforcement activities and slowing the merger process overall. In the case of mergers on a national scale, the need of firms to
contend with several states' attorneys general, each concerned with
his or her state's own agenda, would undoubtedly delay the process.
Second, the merger process is less predictable after American
Stores because the enforcement process will be generally more
confusing for firms contemplating merger than when firms had to

68. See infra text accompanying notes 91-107.
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contend only with federal authorities. When should firms include
the states in their merger planning? What procedures should the
firms follow if they decide to consult with the states? What rights
do the parties possess throughout the process? One commentator
has suggested that after American Stores, "several states or private
plaintiffs might bring suits challenging a merger in different federal
courts, each [asserting their own] divestiture demands." 9 Firms
will have no indication through the antitrust enforcement process
whether their merger will become the subject of multiple federal
suits.
Third, American Stores disrupts the predictability of the enforcement process by weakening the federal government's ability to
negotiate settlements with the merging firms. Firms have little
incentive to settle with federal authorities absent some assurance of
finality. 70 In fact, American Stores made a similar argument in its
brief to the Supreme Court.7' The government's settlement power
is diminished because firms do not necessarily benefit by conceding to particular federal requests regarding the merger if they cannot be assured in return that states will not initiate post-merger
suits. Separate state enforcement of federal merger laws renders
FTC and DOJ approval merely tentative. Firms cannot follow the
federal review process exclusively if they wish to obtain finality, at
least to the extent finality from negotiated settlements has ever
been possible. To obtain relatively final approval, firms must now
subject proposed mergers to at least two processes (and maybe
more where several states become involved) that may assess the
merger under potentially conflicting analytical standards. Thus, after
American Stores, merging firms are left without clear enforcement
standards or procedures that address the divestiture issue vis a vis
the states.

69. Kenneth E. Newman, High Court Upholds Challenges to Mergers, N.Y. L.J.,June
4, 1990, at 5, 8.

70. See supra text accompanying notes 37-43.
71. See Respondent's Brief at 43, California v. American Stores Co., 110 S. Ct. 1853
(1990) (No. 89-258) American Stores suggested that Congress acted wisely in limiting the
remedies available to "non-federal plaintiffs" because of the "potential for abuse" from
empowering these parties with the full range of remedies. Respondent argued that if given
the opportunity, such plaintiffs would be able to seek post hoc structural remedies that
would have a negative impact on merger enforcement. Id.
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PART II
In this Part, the note examines federal and state antitrust policies and evaluates the roles of federal and state authorities in enforcing antitrust laws. This analysis provides background useful for
developing modifications to the antitrust enforcement scheme which
will improve the predictability of the outcome and process for
merging firms.
A.

Federal Antitrust Policy: An Overview

Federal antitrust policy is best understood through an examination of the Department of Justice Merger Guidelines.7 2 The Merger Guidelines are designed to indicate when the DOJ is likely to
challenge a merger.73 It is also important to recognize that the
theoretical foundation for the policies and procedures outlined in
the Merger Guidelines reflect the economic philosophy of the Chicago School. 74 The fact that mergers may prove to be
procompetitive in some markets while anticompetitive in others
complicates antitrust enforcement. The Merger Guidelines represent
the federal government's effort to design an enforcement scheme
which renders appropriate results in light of this inherent conflict.
Antitrust law developed in response to the general objection to
undue market power. The Sherman Act,75 the Clayton Act76 and
subsequent legislation" were intended to prevent the concentration
of industry in the hands of a few. The language of the Merger
Guidelines remains consistent with this policy, noting that the
"unifying theme of the Merger Guidelines is that mergers should

72. Merger Guidelines, supra note 27. The Merger Guidelines "state . . . the present
enforcement policy of the U.S. Department of Justice . . . concerning acquisition and
mergers . . . subject to section 7 of the Clayton Act . . . [and] describe the general

principles and specific standards normally used by the Department in analyzing mergers."
Id. at 26,827.
73. Id. ("Mhe Department [of Justice] hopes to reduce the uncertainty associated with
enforcement of the antitrust laws . . .).

74. For a complete discussion of the emergence of the Chicago School in antitrust law
enforcement, see Austin, supra note 28, at 945-49. Austin traces the case history through
which the Chicago School theories prevailed as the dominant analytical standard. Id. at
950-54. Austin also noted that personnel changes in key judicial and executive positions
have helped to expedite the prevalence of Chicago theories in merger analysis. Id. at 948.
75. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7.
76. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18.
77. Cellar-Kefauver Amendment, 15 U.S.C. § 18; Hart-Scott-Rodino § 7A, 15 U.S.C. §
18a.
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not be permitted to create or enhance 'market power' . . . .,7
The Merger Guidelines define market power as the "ability of
one or more firms [sellers] profitably to maintain prices above
competitive levels for a significant period of time . . ,,79 Likewise, buyers exercise market power when they depress the price of
a product below the competitive level."0 In either instance, the result is a misallocation of resources between buyers and sellers."1
Cartel formation and other
forms of collusion can signal an ability
82
to exercise market power.
The Merger Guidelines incorporate a number of methods for
analyzing market power 3 which focus on the relationship between
a merger and the participating firms' market 4 to determine
whether unacceptable levels of market power will result.8 5 The
analytical method incorporated in federal policy draws heavily from
Chicago School teachings that advocate a comprehensive factual
economic analysis of each merger to determine whether it will
have anticompetitive effects instead of bright-line tests. 6 According to the Merger Guidelines,
it is not possible to remove the exercise of judgment from
the evaluation of mergers under the antitrust laws. Because
the specific standards set forth in the Merger Guidelines
78. Merger Guidelines, supra note 27, at 27,827.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See id. at 26,833 (indicating that the DOJ is more likely to challenge a merger in
which the firms have been found to have colluded in setting prices).
83. For a critique of the analytical methods used in the Merger Guidelines, see R.
Preston McAfee & Michael A. Williams, The Department of Justice Merger Guidelines: A
Critique and a Proposed Improvement, 16 PEPP. L. REv. 1069, 1070 (1989) (concluding
that both the rationale and the standard used in the Merger Guidelines are flawed and
proposing an alternative).
84. The Merger Guidelines define a market as:
a product or group of products and a geographical area in which it is sold
such that a hypothetical, profit-maximizing firm, not subject to price regulation,
that was the only present and future seller of those products in that area would
impose a "small but significant and non-transitory" increase in price above
prevailing or likely future levels.
Merger Guidelines, supra note 27, at 26,827.
85. See id. at 26,830-37 (discussing the methods of determining market power and the
levels of market power DOJ finds acceptable).
86. See Austin, supra note 28, at 948-49 (noting the contrast between the Chicago
School's emphasis on economic analysis to determine whether a merger is permissible and
older Warren Court decisions which used bright-line tests based on more subjective criteria).
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must be applied to a broad range of possible factual circumstances, strict application of those standards may provide misleading answers to the economic questions raised
under the antitrust laws..'.. Therefore, the Department
will apply the standards of the Merger Guidelines reasonably and flexibly to the particular facts and circumstances
of each proposed merger.87
Federal antitrust policy is also consistent with Chicago School
teachings which recognize that efficiency is a desirable benefit to
be derived from mergers." Former Attorney General William
French Smith stated that "[i]mplicit throughout the Merger Guidelines is the recognition that the efficiency-enhancing potential of
mergers can increase the competitiveness of firms and result in
lower prices to consumers." 9 By recognizing the benefits derived
from efficiencies, the DOJ's antitrust policy encourages the healthy
development of the economy.
[Miergers generally play an important role in a free
enterprise economy. They can penalize ineffective management and facilitate the efficient flow of investment capital
and the redeployment of existing productive assets. While
challenging competitively harmful mergers, the Department
seeks to avoid unnecessary interference with that larger
universe of mergers that are either competitively beneficial
or neutral. 9°
The Merger Guidelines are by no means a wholly accurate
measure of whether a merger will result in undue market power.
But the federal policy embodied in them appropriately acknowledges the necessity of maintaining some flexibility in applying the
specific analytical standards promulgated to effectuate the antitrust
laws. Flexible application of the standards relieves some of the
tension between the broad language of section 7 of the Clayton

87. Merger Guidelines, supra note 27, at 26,827.
88. One Chicago School advocate, Judge Easterbrook, believes that efficiency should be
the first priority in enforcing the antitrust laws. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MIcH. L. REv. 1696, 1703-04 (1986) (explaining how goals other than
efficiency require judges to redistribute income).
89. William French Smith, Att'y Gen., Statement Accompanying Release of Revised
Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,824, 26,826 (1984). Smith also noted that "the Department considers and gives appropriate weight to efficiency claims in all cases in which
they are established by clear and convincing evidence." Id.
90. Merger Guidelines, supra note 27, at 26,827.
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Act and the difficulty of articulating a consistent, workable and
accurate method for evaluating mergers.
B.

State Antitrust Policy: An Overview

During the past several years, state antitrust enforcement has
increased. Viewing federal enforcement as inadequate, and active
antitrust enforcement as necessary to maintaining or improving
their local economies, state attorneys general have pursued efforts
to strengthen and coordinate their antitrust enforcement laws and
procedures.9 Most notably, the National Association of Attorneys
General (NAAG) has attempted to enhance and coordinate a state
antitrust enforcement program to protect local markets and consum92
ers.
The emergence of the NAAG as the catalyst for active, coordinated enforcement efforts has provided the states with power to
control the outcome of a merger. Like the DOJ, the NAAG has
published both vertical93 and horizontal' restraint guidelines to

91. See NAAG Adopts Resolution Endorsing Model Antitrust Reform Legislation, 51
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1294, at 891 (Dec. 11, 1986) [hereinafter NAAG
Adopts Resolution].
92. State efforts to develop a cooperative antitrust enforcement program reflect the
concern that individual states lack the information necessary to evaluate a prospective
merger's impact on its local economies. For the states, costly court orders are required to
obtain what amounts to HSR filing information. Efforts by states to obtain this information have met with opposition from both courts and federal legislators. See Mattox v.
FTC, 752 F.2d 116, 124 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that § 7A(h) of the Clayton Act precludes distribution of HSR information to the states); Lieberman v. FTC, 771 F.2d 32, 38
(2d Cir. 1985) (reasoning that because Congress designated the two agencies entitled to
the information (the FTC and DOJ), courts should not imply that other parties, including
the states, are entitled to the information).
Other efforts by the NAAG include the creation of the National Association of Attorneys General Voluntary Pre-Merger Disclosure Compact (Dec. 13, 1987), reprinted in 4
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,410, at 21,201 (Aug. 16, 1988) [hereinafter Compact]. Under
the Compact, states agree not to serve pre-complaint discovery motions on the merging
parties if the merging firms agree to provide the designated state with a copy of the HSR
filing. Id.
13,410, at 21,202; see also Newman, supra note 69, at 8 (summarizing the
Compact's procedures).
The NAAG has also created horizontal and vertical merger guidelines. See infra
notes 93-94. The cooperative efforts of states combined with individual states' antitrust
laws signal states' intent to take an active role in the enforcement process to protect local
markets from the potentially adverse effects of large-scale merger activity.
93. National Association of Attorneys General Vertical Restraints Guidelines (Dec. 4,
1985), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
13,400, at 21,155 (Jan. 31, 1989) [hereinafter Vertical Restraints Guidelines].
94. National Association of Attorneys General Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Mar. 10,
1987), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
13,405, at 21,181 (Jan. 31, 1989) [here-
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set the standards for their merger analyses. 95

The NAAG Guidelines share the federal Merger Guidelines'
objections to undue market power.96 However, the NAAG expressed dissatisfaction with the laxity of federal standards when it
unanimously approved a more restrictive set of guidelines in March
1987. 97 State antitrust policy diverges concerning enforcement of
federal antitrust law from the theoretical underpinnings of the federal rules by focusing on a variety of local concerns not necessarily evaluated through economic analysis. Drawing from Warren
Court precedent,98 the NAAG Guidelines state: "Other goals of
the [antitrust laws] were the prevention of excessive levels of industrial concentration because of the political and social effects of
concentrated economic power ..
and the maintenance of opportunities for small and regional businesses to compete." 99 For example, state concerns include local ownership of business, consumer
pricing and commitment to the community.1'e One commentator

inafter Horizontal Merger Guidelines].
95. Seymour D. Lewis, a former Special Assistant to the U.S. Attorney General in the
Antitrust Division comments:
The NAAG Merger Guidelines differ from those of the Justice Department and the FTC in many important respects. The NAAG Merger Guidelines make no presumption that mergers are efficiency-enhancing and assert that
efficiencies are not to be viewed as a defense. Above all, they emphasize that
Congress, in amending Section 7 of the Clayton Act in 1950, determined that
highly concentrated industries were characterized by the exercise of market
power and that Congress intended to prohibit mergers even prior to the actual
attainment or exercise of market power i.e., when there was a trend toward
harmful concentration.
Lewis, supra note 36, at 37.
96. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 94,
13,405, at 21,185 (reviewing purposes of federal laws).
97. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 94,
13,405, at 21,181.
98. See supra note 28.
99. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 94,
13,405, at 21,185 (citing Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315-16 (1962)). See ahso Helene D. Jaffe, Report From the National Association of Attorneys General - State Antitrust Enforcement
Programs: Multi-State Compact Procedure and Pre-Merger Review, 58 ANTrTRUST L. J.
223, 225 (1989) (noting that when states evaluate a merger, considerations they employ
often "fall outside the ambit of pure economic theory . . . ").
100. See Jaffe, supra note 99, at 227 (illustrating the local nature of states' concerns by
recounting one merger in which a state concern was the resulting firm's commitment to
continue contributions to local charities); NAAG Adopts Resolution, supra note 91, at 892
(discussing concerns of state attorneys general set out in the NAAG Horizontal Merger
Guidelines). One of California's primary concerns with respect to the merger of American
Stores and Lucky Stores was the anticipated effect on consumer prices of joining two of
the state's largest supermarket chains. California v. American Stores, Co., 110 S. Ct.
1853, 1856 (1990).
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notes that proposed mergers of particular types of businesses such
as supermarkets, department stores, theater chains, gas stations and
other retailers, run the greatest risk of close scrutiny by a state."0
States are especially attentive to mergers of these enterprises because they may pose a serious threat to the local economy through
increased prices and decreased supply.
State antitrust policy also differs from federal policy with respect to its view of efficiency. While states recognize that efficiency gains may accompany mergers, the states accord this benefit
less weight than the federal government. Again relying heavily
upon Warren era precedent, the NAAG Guidelines state:
To the limited extent that Congress was concerned with
productive efficiency.., it prescribed the prevention of
high levels of market concentration as a means to this end.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has clearly ruled that any
conflict between the goal of preventing anticompetitive
mergers and that of increasing efficiency must be resolved
in favor of the former explicit and predominant concern of
the Congress.'°2
Critics of proposed state antitrust enforcement measures base
their objections on what they perceive as the states' aggressive attitudes against mergers. For example, the NAAG's Voluntary PreMerger Disclosure Compact has been severely criticized. William
F. Baxter, a former Antitrust Division chief, labeled the Compact

101. Jaffe, supra note 99, at 224-25.
102. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 94,
13,405, at 21,185. The NAAG
Guidelines draws its language in part from FTC v. Proctor & Gamble, 386 U.S. 568, 580
(1967) where the Warren Court stated: "Possible economies cannot be used as a defense
to illegality. Congress was aware that some mergers which lessen competition may also
result in economies but it struck the balance in favor of protecting competition.One author describes the Warren Court's decisions as fuzzy "societal antitrust," characterized by enforcement based primarily upon value judgments and support for a policy
of protectionism for small businesses. Arthur D. Austin, The Emergence of Societal Antitrust, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 903 (1972). Professor Austin describes the majority opinions of
the Warren era as "a metamorphosis of economics, populism, and opaque value judgments." Austin, supra note 28, at 935. Austin also notes that under decisions such as
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), the Court created highly restrictive analytical tests for determining the permissibility of a merger. He argues that the
Court's interpretation of the Cellar-Kefauver amendment to the Clayton Act in that case
proscribed merger activity whenever "(1) there is a probability or a 'tendency' toward
oligopoly; (2) other mergers will be 'triggered'; (3) mom and pop enterprises may be
eliminated; or (4) the acquisition creates efficiencies." Id. at 936. (citing Brown Shoe, 370
U.S. at 311-23).

1992]

MERGER ENFORCEMENT

"more a political attack than a serious effort to write merger guidelines."" He described the Compact as defining markets in artificial terms not tied to economic reality, resulting in an interventionist, overly restrictive set of rules.'0 4 Baxter concluded that the
NAAG's guidelines were a return to the Warren/Douglas era,"05
creating a presumption against the validity of all mergers."6 Utah
Attorney General David L. Wilkinson also criticized the Compact
as creating "a kind of shadow government to the national government [the founders] devised."1" These criticisms support the view
that state antitrust policy actively seeks to preserve local markets
and promote non-economic considerations through an over-aggressive antitrust enforcement process.
An over-aggressive state antitrust program tends to destabilize
the federal enforcement process. A state enforcement process based
on criteria different from that considered by the federal government
results in a two-tiered enforcement structure. Merging firms may
find structuring their transactions to reconcile the disparate values
advocated by state and federal authorities a formidabld task. Unless
the federal enforcement process can account for state activity
through appropriate modifications, beneficial mergers might fail
based solely on local concerns. If the federal enforcement process
is to be changed, should the modifications advance existing federal
policy or incorporate the states' policies of protecting local markets
and employment?

103. NAAG Explores Use of Compact To Get Premerger Notification Data, 52 Antitrust
& Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1320, at 1138 (June 18, 1987) [hereinafter NAAG Explores Use of Compact]. Reiterating Baxter's comments regarding the Compact, Utah
Attorney General David L. Wilkinson expressed his dissent to the adoption of the Compact in a letter to the NAAG. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Austin, supra note 28, at 935-36 (reviewing the Warren/Douglas antitrust enforcement era in which a variety of quantitative methods were employed to actively oppose mergers in support of socio-economic goals rather than market objectives).
106. See NAAG Explores Use of Compact, supra note 103, at 1138. Baxter concluded:
[t]he pervasive theme of the [NAAG Guidelines] is that there should
be a presumption against the validity of all substantial mergers and that all
should be attacked unless they're clearly permissible within the standards of the
old Supreme Court cases. The authors see no harm in attacking even those
mergers which, in the end, prove to be lawful: in their view it's the court's
job to repel overly zealous enforcement. This of course is insane, because, as a
business matter, the great majority of proposed mergers cannot survive the
delay imposed upon a transaction by an ill-founded antitrust attack.

Id.
107. Id.
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PART III
A.

State Involvement in the Enforcement Process

The Supreme Court's holding in American Stores" serves as
a reminder that the populist foundations of the antitrust laws are
not dead: purely economic considerations will not override vigorous
antitrust enforcement and the right of any party to challenge the
permissibility of a merger. Still, the preceding comparison of federal and state antitrust policies illustrates that equal weight cannot be
given to both economic concerns and unfettered enforcement activities if predictable and correct results are desired."° If state
enforcement of federal antitrust law is to continue, it behooves
Congress to define the place of state concerns in the enforcement
scheme. Are outcome and process sufficiently predictable for merging firms if states are permitted to use the federal antitrust laws to
promote their own, parochial interests? Should federal enforcement
policy incorporate the interests reflected by states' efforts into a
more unified enforcement structure?
In response to these fundamental policy concerns, Congress
could eliminate altogether the states' right to seek a divestiture.
However, this alternative is unacceptable for three reasons. First,
maintaining the states' right to seek a divestiture is consistent with
the policy that mergers be scrutinized so that (1) important legal
issues are identified, (2) the issues are vigorously debated, and (3)
a correct result is reached regarding the merger's permissibility.
Upholding the states' right to seek a divestiture checks political
biases which might tend to make enforcement lax, ensuring a thorough examination of complex legal issues prior to merger approval.
Second, The political sentiments underlying the antitrust laws
weigh against eliminating the states' right to seek divestiture. One
author describes the antitrust laws as "a 'charter of liberty,' ...
and a 'bulwark against arbitrary action and oppression at the hands
of the economically powerful' ...
suggest[ing] individual freedoms, freedom to control one's destiny, freedom in something
other than the economic realm . . . ."'o Unless Congress is will-

108. California v. American Stores, Co., 110 S. Ct. 1853 (1990).
109. "Correct" results refer to an analysis of mergers which allows procompetitive
mergers to proceed and prevents anticompetitive ones.
110. David W. Barnes, Nonefficiency Goals in the Antitrust Law of Mergers, 30 WM.&
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ing to battle these deeply entrenched societal values, a less drastic
remedy is required.
Finally, practical considerations favor preserving a state cause
of action under the federal antitrust laws. As participants in the enforcement process, states contribute additional resources not otherwise available to the FTC or the DOJ. More importantly, states
enforcing federal laws are less likely to enact their own, more
restrictive antitrust statutes. States have already organized and created separate enforcement procedures because, they are prohibited
access to the pre-merger HRS information filed with the FTC and
DO." Eliminating a state cause of action for divestiture would
exacerbate the problem of disparate antitrust standards. A better,
more efficient alternative is to combine federal and state enforcement efforts, allowing states to be players in the review process
with federal authorities and the merging firms.
B. The Proposal
Congress should amend section 7A(h) of the Clayton Act to:
(1) allow for the distribution of the Hart-Scott-Rodino i.nformation to the states, and
(2) limit the states' right to use the Hart-Scott-Rodino information to instances where it is used for pre-merger analysis under the
Department Of Justice Merger Guidelines or for bringing a suit
under section 7 of the Clayton Act.
This proposal for legislative reform of the anti-merger laws
reflects the need for the states' presence in the enforcement process. It incorporates a divestiture remedy for the states, increases
the predictability of the outcome and process of merger enforcement, and relieves the existing tension between broad legal standards in the existing antitrust statutes and their ability to render
correct results. The proposal also continues to fulfill the objective
of antitrust law to "promote consumer welfare through the efficient
use and allocation of resources, the development of new and improved products, and the introduction of new production, distribution, and organizational techniques for putting economic resources

MARY L. REv. 787, 835 (1989) (footnote omitted).
111. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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112
to beneficial use."

1. Distribution of the HSR Information
State efforts to obtain the HSR filing information have been
unsuccessful." 3 Courts have denied the states access to this information by strictly construing the language of section 7A(h) of the
Clayton Act: "documentary material filed with the Assistant Attorney General or the Federal Trade Commission... shall be exempt
from disclosure ...
and no such information ...
may be made
public . .
,,14 In Lieberman v. FTC, the court "doubt[ed] if

Congress would have intended to have the staffs of fifty state
attorneys general sitting as oversight committees reacting to [FTC
or DOJ] decisions whether to block large-scale mergers of national
or international significance.".. Given the current climate of state
merger enforcement, this comment by the Lieberman court is probably not far from the truth.
Following the American Stores decision, however, the argument
in favor of disclosure is stronger. A post-merger divestiture implies
that the initial decision permitting the merger was incorrect. State
involvement in the federal enforcement process could help to complete, correct or contribute to the information found in the HSR
filings to prevent errant decisions before fim-s consummate mergers. Distributing HSR information to the states facilitates their
analyses of proposed mergers and contribution to the enforcement
process.
Finns undertaking a merger should submit HSR information to
the federal agency (FTC or DOJ) assigned to the area of commerce
affected by the merger. Distribution of the information to the states
should occur via a method similar to that set out in the NAAG's
Voluntary Pre-Merger Disclosure Compact." 6 The Compact designates that a "liaison state," one of several members of the Compact, receive the information" 7 and establishes an order of preference within this group of member states to determine which will
act as liaison. The HSR information is to be distributed first to

112. Donald F. Turner, The Durability, Relevance, and Future of American Antitrust
Policy, 75 CAL. L. REV. 797, 798 (1987).
113. See supra note 92.
114. Clayton Act § 7A, 15 U.S.C. § 18a(h).
115. 771 F.2d 32, 40 (2d Cir. 1985).
116. See Compact, supra note 92,
13,410, at 21,201-02.
117. Id. 13,410, at 21,202.

1992]

MERGER ENFORCEMENT

"the Attorney General of the state which is the principal place of
business of the acquiring party,... next to the Attorney General
of the state which is the principal place of business of the acquired
party, next to the Attorney General of the state of incorporation of
the acquiring party and next to the Attorney General of the state of
incorporation of the acquired party.".. Adopting a similar structure for distributing the HSR information to the states is logical
because these parties will have the most significant interest in the
outcome of the merger.
2. Restricting the States' Use of the HSR Information
The success of this proposal as a viable alternative to the existing enforcement structure depends upon limiting the states' use of
the HSR information. The objective of this proposal is to transform
the concurrent federal/state enforcement of the federal anti-merger
laws into a single enforcement process. Consistent with that goal,
the proposal would prevent the collateral use of HSR information
by the states to proscribe a merger through means other than the
federal antitrust laws. Without this restriction, the states' power
over the merging firms would be too great.
First, with free access to firms' confidential information, states
could challenge mergers under their own state antitrust laws. States
dissatisfied with federal enforcement efforts have tried to grasp this
power by proposing their own Model Legislation for Antitrust
Reform. 19 Title VIII of the Model Legislation proposes to amend
section 7A(h) of the Clayton Act to provide: "Nothing in this
section is intended to prevent disclosure [of the HSR information]
to state Attorneys General for the purpose of investigating or enforcing a claim under the federal or state antitrust laws ...."'
Restricting states' use of HSR information cannot prevent states
from enforcing their own antitrust laws altogether. However, states
would not be able to use information obtained through the proposed distribution procedure in their state law cases. States may
use the HSR information only to negotiate in the pre-merger stages
or to bring a suit under section 7 of the Clayton Act.121 Further-

118. Id. (footnote omitted).
119. See NAAG's Proposed Model Legislation For Antitrust Reform, 51 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1294, at 914 (Dec. 11, 1986) (setting forth the states' proposal for modification of federal antitrust laws in order to meet their enforcement needs).
120. Id. at 916 (emphasis altered).
121. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18.
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more, states would be required to announce that they intend to sue
prior to the merger's completion or be estopped from bringing a
section 7 suit for divestiture in the future." Therefore, to file a
section 7 suit, a state would be required to actively participate in
the pre-merger evaluation and negotiation of each merger.
Second, restricting states' use of HSR information would prevent them from delaying action. For example, suppose a merging
firm files HSR information with the DOJ and state authorities. The
DOJ conducts its analysis and approves the merger. The state opposes the merger, but rather than inform the firm of its objections,
the state waits for the DOJ's evaluation and the completion of the
merger. Thereafter, the state uses the HSR information to file a
section 7 suit seeking divestiture. The enforcement regulations
proposed here create reasonable restrictions on the use of the HSR
information so that the states cannot follow this hypothetical scenario and unfairly surprise the merging firms with an unexpected
suit under federal antitrust law.
Finally, in extending the divestiture remedy to states and private parties, the American Stores decision opens the door for inconsistent verdicts.123 This proposal closes that door through its
use of the "liaison state."' 24 States must channel their concerns
through the liaison state, and the liaison, as the representative of
all other interested states, would be the only state entitled to bring
a section 7 suit. Thus, this proposal strikes a balance which allows
the states to assuage their concerns about mergers while protecting
firms from untimely divestiture orders.
C. Predictability Regained
1.

PREDICTABILITY OF THE

OUTcOME: A SINGLE STANDARD

Critics of state antitrust enforcement argue that those efforts
will lead to a proliferation of erroneous and inconsistent standards
among the courts."z This problem arises when states attempt to
122. The goal of this provision is to prevent a state from raising a divestiture suit
immediately following the completion of a merger. The provision ensures that at the time
of the merger, the liaison state was on notice of the details of the merger, that it participated in analyzing the transaction and that it raised any existing concerns. Circumstances
may justify a § 7 suit for divestiture at a later date. See supra text accompanying notes
31-36. However, any subsequent suit would have to be assessed taking account of the
state's knowledge of the transaction at the time it took place.
123. See Newman, supra note 69, at 6 (discussing the potential adverse effects of the
American Stores decision).
124. See supra text accompanying notes 117-18.
125. See Lewis, supra note 36, at 38 (noting Washington, D.C. lawyer Robert Bell's as-
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prohibit mergers based on standards other than those employed in
federal enforcement efforts. For example, "[t]he NAAG Guidelines
follow the Supreme Court precedents which make it easier for the
plaintiff - federal, state, or private - to win.s 12 6 Unfortunately,
these precedents reflect the policies of an era when mergers were
considered inherently bad and the Supreme Court constructed criteria to defeat them. 127 By asserting federal claims based on old
antitrust doctrine, states could lead courts to resurrect standards that
would conflict with those embodied in current antitrust enforcement
policy. Effective modifications to the merger enforcement process
must incorporate a single policy whose "primary function... is to
protect and promote... procompetitive conduct, not to protect
individual competitors as such."" s Adopting a single analytical
standard for merger enforcement guards against revival of outdated
criteria.
Additionally, inconsistent standards impede a firm's ability to
predict whether the federal or state authorities will challenge their
proposed merger. Because federal and state policies differ, constructing a merger to meet the standards of one authority will often
cause a conflict with the other. The wisdom of enforcing federal
antitrust laws that adhere to two conflicting standards must be
questioned. Modifying the enforcement process to allow federal and
state agencies to consistently evaluate each merger under one set of
standards offers merging firms more certainty in planning their
transactions.
Admittedly, the rules proposed here cannot force states to adopt
an antitrust policy they believe counter to their interests. Thus,
with respect to state antitrust laws, states may continue to analyze
mergers as they do now. However, these modifications would at
least ensure that a state intending to pursue a section 7 suit would
frame its arguments against a merger to conform with federal policies implicated by the transactions, not local policies.
This section proposes that the Justice Department's 1984 Merg-

sertion that no state has the expertise that the FfC has in analyzing large mergers, which
Bell made in response to the position of Lloyd Constantine, chief of the Antitrust Law
Section of the ABA and supporter of state enforcement of national merger laws).
126. Id. at 37.
127. See Austin, supra note 28, at 932-45 (tracing the history of merger enforcement

and noting periods when mergers were considered inherently anticompetitive). See also
supra text accompanying notes 90-98.
128. Turner, supra note 112, at 798.
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er Guidelines" 9 provide the analytical framework for the modified enforcement program. The Merger Guidelines reflect federal
Examining
policymakers' belief that efficiency is beneficial.'
several of the economic trends affecting U.S. firms today illustrates
the necessity of continuing this policy. First, as markets continue to
globalize, pressure on U.S. firms to compete internationally increases. Federal antitrust policy must allow for the myriad of industries
and markets to which it will be applied. Accounting for this diversity of commercial enterprises requires that many of the goals of
state antitrust policy be subordinated to national considerations.
State enforcement efforts focusing on more parochial interests may
hinder or prevent those mergers that, viewed from a national perspective, would create efficient and ultimately more competitive
3
firms.1 '
Second, according to one author, "antitrust doctrine is succumbing to new business relationships."' The on-going evolution of
large-scale industry often extends firms' operations into a number
of markets, both regionally and nationally. Large-scale enterprises
have been described as vertically disaggregated, due to their reliance on many other firms for a variety of business functions; the
corporation is being redefined as a network of subsidiaries.' 3 3
Firms adopt this structure because it is more efficient and increases
their ability to compete in the marketplace.
Antitrust law is out of step not only with emerging business
organizations, but with the laws of other nations as well. United
States antitrust law has been described as "an American
provincialism."134 Arguably, U.S. antitrust laws place domestic
firms at a disadvantage with their foreign competitors. Subjecting
American firms to restrictions other governments do not impose on
their foreign counterparts may cost American companies a competitive edge. 13 A modified federal antitrust enforcement process
should account for this problem by removing state-imposed restrictions which inhibit effective competition by domestic firms in the

129.
130.
131.
132.

Merger Guidelines, supra note 27. See also supra text accompanying notes 73-91.
See supra text accompanying notes 88-90.
Lewis, supra note 36, at 39.
Austin, supra note 28, at 961. Austin also predicts that the inability of antitrust

law to account for emerging business structures will be the law's demise. Id.
133. Id. (citing Special Report, And Now, the Post-Industrial Corporation, Bus. WK.,

Mar. 3, 1986, at 64).
134. Id. at 960.
135. LESTER C. THUROW, THE ZERO-SuM SOCIETY 146 (1980).
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global market." Assuming increased efficiency will enable firms
to become more competitive, a federal law should favor standards
that allow firms to operate more efficiently.
2.

Benefits of Predictability Of The Process Recovered

The modifications proposed in this note will make the enforcement process more timely in three ways. First, this proposal brings
together the three parties most interested in a merger: merging
firms, federal authorities and state authorities. Logistically, one
enforcement process is more likely to render timely results than
two. This is especially true where the parties involved will use the
same analytical standards to evaluate mergers as proposed here.
Second, this proposal accelerates the enforcement process by
focusing authorities' attention on the merger during its early stages.
Because all of the parties will have the HSR information at the
outset, state and federal authorities can discover potential problems
and raise their concerns at earlier stages. States will not have to
engage in the time consuming process of serving investigative
subpoenas on the merging parties in order to assess the details of
the transaction.'37 Firms can enter the enforcement process expecting to receive a response from reviewing authorities more
quickly.
Finally, as the old saying goes, time is money. In deciding

136. States tend to define markets more narrowly than the federal Merger Guidelines.
See supra text accompanying notes 84 (Merger Guidelines' definitions) and 96-102 (state
guidelines). When markets are more narrowly defined, proposed mergers are more likely
to result in impermissibly high levels of market share.
For example, in 1988, the Canadian corporation Campeau attempted to acquire Federated Department Stores for $6.5 billion. Lewis, supra note 36, at 37. Campeau had
previously acquired Allied Stores, which, in turn, owned Jordan Marsh Stores. IL Jordan
Marsh competed directly with the Federated-owned Filene Stores. IX Federated argued that
if Campeau were permitted to acquire Federated, Campeau would control 50 percent of
the market of moderate- to better-priced stores. Id According to the FTC, however, the
relevant market was broader than that described by Federated, encompassing both specialty
stores and mass merchandisers. Id Under the FTC's market definition, the acquisition of
Federated would not give Campeau an impermissible market share. Il Subsequently, the
states of Massachusetts, Maine and New Hampshire challenged the merger based on
Federated's arguments and obtained a consent decree forcing Campeau to divest itself of
all Filene stores. Id at 37-38.
137. Currently, states must serve investigative subpoenaes, civil investigative demands or
other precomplaint demands on the merging firms to obtain the HSR information. See
Compact, supra note 80, 92,
13,410, at 21,201. In the NAAG's Voluntary Pre-Merger
Disclosure Compact, the states agree to forgo these demands if the merging firms provide
the HSR information to them. Id
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whether or not to merge, firms must consider the cost of the transaction itself. The longer firms have to spend executing mergers, the
more those transactions will cost. Eventually, the merging firms
will have the option of complying with requests aimed at alleviating the concerns of enforcement authorities and negotiating a settlement with them or walking away from the merger. The sooner this
option is presented, the less firms will spend on the merger in the
intervening period when they can only guess what steps they
should be taking to satisfy enforcement authorities. Furthermore, if
firms can count on early guidance from reviewing authorities, they
may be more willing to undertake questionable mergers which
could yield more efficient business organizations. The potential for
multiple reviews and conflicting opinions of mergers under the
existing enforcement scheme weighs against pursuing mergers the
government may be more likely to find objectionable. In addition,
government authorities will spend less on any particular enforcement proceeding if they coordinate their activities and reduce the
time that would otherwise be devoted by each. For these reasons, a
more timely process is in the best interests of all parties involved.
Involving states with the federal authorities in a single, coordinated enforcement process relieves firms from having to guess
whether or not to approach the state with their merger plans. 3
This proposal makes the enforcement process more predictable for
merging firms by clarifying (1) when the states are to be involved
in the federal enforcement process, (2) what procedures the states
must follow, and (3) what rights and obligations the states possess.
Incorporating state enforcement efforts into a single process
eliminates the uncertainty of when the states will exercise their
power to enforce antitrust statutes. Presently, states have the benefit
of waiting until the FTC or DOJ announces whether or not it
intends to challenge a merger before acting under their own authority to enforce the federal law. Obviously, if the federal authorities

138. Firms must now engage in a cost-benefit analysis to assess whether information
should be given to states in the pre-merger process. State review may create impediments
for the merging firms that outweigh the chance for state approval of the deal. Under the
current process, approaching a state with a merger proposal could raise several problems.
First, an independent state investigation of the merger may delay the transaction. Second,
a state may apply a different standard to test the plan and require undesirable modifications in the merger. See supra text accompanying notes 119-21. Finally, the state may
object to the transaction altogether, opening the door to a suit challenging the merger. In
light of these potential hazards, firms may conclude that the less the states know about
their plans, the better.
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decide to challenge a merger, a state would probably choose not to
expend its own resources to duplicate the federal effort. Conversely, if the FrC or DOJ approves the merger, a state may then
choose to investigate and challenge a questionable transaction on
its own. After American Stores, a state can even wait to bring a
divestiture until after firms have completed a merger."" Therefore, firms have a significant interest in learning what objections a
state may have to a proposed merger. Under this proposal, firms
are alerted to state objections early in the review process because
states are involved from the start.
This proposal also clearly designates the procedures the states
must follow as part of the enforcement team." For example,
states are required to evaluate each merger and must announce
their intentions to challenge a merger before it is complete or be
estopped from filing a post-merger suit.141 Specific enforcement
procedures make the process more predictable.
Finally, by defining the rights and obligations of the states and
firms involved, all parties will know what information must be
exchanged, what effect review can have on the outcome of the
transaction and when firms have cleared enforcement hurdles that
could block completion of the transaction. To summarize, under
this proposal, states have the right to receive and evaluate the HSR
information and to voice their concerns and objections. They have
the obligation to announce to the firms whether they intend to
challenge the merger or be estopped from filing a post-merger
section 7 suit. Firms have the obligation to submit the HSR information to the appropriate state authorities. If each party complies with these rules, firms can complete their mergers reasonably
certain that the transactions are permissible under the antitrust laws.
Finality is perhaps the most important, yet elusive, objective of
pre-merger review by enforcement authorities. Finality exists when
firms can rely on the government's decision not to challenge a
merger.142 When the enforcement process consistently renders
pro-competitive results, federal and state authorities will be less
likely to institute post-merger proceedings. In turn, the finality of
139. California v. American Stores, Co., 110 S.Ct. 1853, 1867 (1990).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 112-24.
141. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
142. Because markets are continually evolving, antitrust law may prove unreceptive to
an absolute bar on post-merger government challenges. However, the pre-merger enforcement process makes those suits less likely to occur and, thus, acts as an incentive
for firms to comply with the rules for review. See supra text accompanying notes 30-35.
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federal and state merger decisions will be increased.
The proposed modifications help to ensure finality by prohibiting those mergers that tend to eliminate competition without yielding economic benefits. 43 At the same time, the comprehensive
dialogue among merging firms and reviewing authorities offers a
renewed incentive for firms to comply with the federal antitrust
statutes and encourages procompetitive mergers to proceed. Three
scenarios illustrate how this proposal increases the likelihood that
the opinions of reviewing authorities that a merger is permissible
will be reliable.
In the first scenario, both federal and state authorities agree not
to challenge a merger. Because of the state's involvement in the
process, firms may proceed with the merger confident that the
decision is a reliable indicator the transaction will not be challenged. Even if states are compelled to use the federal Merger
Guidelines, 1" state authorities will undoubtedly pursue every
avenue offered by them to scrutinize each merger for adverse consequences to their local economies. 45 However, if, after an initial
evaluation, the state approves the merger, then firms can reasonably
rely on their decision being final..
In the second scenario, federal authorities approve the merger,
but state authorities challenge it. Even in this situation, the process
offers greater prospects for finality because firms will be encouraged to negotiate the terms of the merger with the states. At this
point in the pre-merger period, firms will know the concerns of the
state and can choose to comply with state demands for modification or abandon the merger. Negotiations with the state can be targeted to eliminate those aspects of the merger to which the state
has objected and should protect firms from a future suit. 4 6
In the third scenario, both federal and state authorities decide
to challenge a proposed merger. As in the second scenario, merging firms will have a clear indication of the governments' objections and will not have to speculate about whether or not a chal-

143. See Turner, supra note 112, at 798 (noting that even "populist" goals of antitrust
enforcement are served by economics-based analysis when the analysis prevents merger
activity that yields no economic benefit to society).
144. See supra note 27.
145. It is unlikely that this proposal will prompt states to disregard their local economic
interests for the sake of economic benefits evident from a broader perspective of a transaction. States are likely to examine most critically those mergers they suspect will adversely affect local interests.
146. But see supra text accompanying notes 30-35.
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lenge will ensue if merger plans proceed without modification.
Both the current enforcement process and the proposed enforcement process may require firms to modify their original merger
proposal in order to satisfy both the federal and state governments
involved. However, using a single analytical' standard ensures that
the firms will not be faced with conditions raised by federal and
state agencies that are mutually exclusive. The proposed modifications offer firms a better opportunity to make informed judgments
about proceeding with merger plans. The choice is simple: firms
either negotiate an acceptable settlement with federal and state
authorities or face the possibility of a section 7 suit by enforcement authorities.
Furthermore, the proposed process should increase the number
of correct results because state involvement enables a more
thorough analysis of the HRS information and encourages more
vigorous enforcement under the Merger Guidelines. 47 Critics argue that the states lack the expertise needed to analyze large mergers. 148 States complain that the DOJ and FTC do not engage in
the rigorous enforcement necessary to protect their economies from
anticompetitive mergers. By working together, state and federal
authorities will be forced to balance state interests and federal
enforcement practices. The tension between their respective interests
will serve as an internal check on the enforcement process. The
FTC and DOJ can ensure that state merger analysis is sound, while
states will have the right to enforce the anti-merger laws against
those mergers they believe have been inappropriately approved by
the federal authorities. The result should be fewer incorrect merger
evaluations and more reliable rulings for merging parties.
CONCLUSION
Federal and state merger enforcement policies are on a collision
course. The federal authorities support mergers that increase efficiency, whereas the states continue to guard the populist goals of
early antitrust law. Absent political or ideological harmony, the
disparate policies will continue to compete with each other to
control economic development. The federal statutes do not provide

147. Justice Stevens noted in California v. American Stores Co., 110 S. Ct. 1853, 1860
(1990), that "[t]he [Clayton] Act's . . . provisions manifest a clear [legislative] intent to
encourage vigorous . . . litigation against anticompetitive mergers.148. See Lewis, supra note 36, at 39 (noting opposition to state antitrust enforcement
efforts).
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the guidance of a single legal standard, making state and federal
enforcement efforts antagonistic rather than complementary.
The American Stores decision left many unanswered questions
for Congress and the courts regarding the role of the states in the
federal merger enforcement process. Paramount among them is
whether the existing antitrust laws are capable of delivering an
efficient, predictable enforcement mechanism. The plain language
of section 16 of the Clayton Act compelled the American Stores
decision allowing states and private plaintiffs the power to seek
divestiture of a merger. However, the time has arrived to rethink
the language of the Act.
The proposed legislative changes advocating the distribution of
the HSR information to the states, with an accompanying limitation
on the use of that information, establish a consolidated federal/state
merger enforcement program. Combining the efforts of federal and
state authorities does not result in an impenetrable wall of enforcement, discouraging those who would otherwise consider a merger.
To the contrary, this proposal facilitates merger enforcement and
planning by adopting the Department of Justice Merger Guidelines
as the single analytical standard for evaluating mergers and by
improving the timeliness, clarity and finality of the enforcement
process.
The proposal also reduces the existing tension between the
broad language of the current anti-merger statutes and their ability
to render accurate results. Through a flexible, fact-oriented, analytical process, the modifications encourage identification and resolution of problems in the early stages of a merger. Final decisions by
the authorities are more accurate and reliable. Furthermore, a joint
federal and state effort has a better chance of rendering correct
results in a body of law that often requires crystal ball predictions.
Congress should adopt policies and mechanisms that facilitate
procompetitive and efficient transactions if American industry is to
compete in an increasingly integrated world economy. Mergers and
acquisitions provide an effective means for fins to grow and
streamline their operations. The proposed legislative modifications
offer a means to merge federal and state enforcement efforts into
an efficient, predictable process that encourages and ensures
procompetitive transactions. Unchanged, current merger enforcement
is destined to lead fins further into a quagmire of uncertainty and
stagnation.
WAYNE H. ELOWE

